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THE POLITICS OF MILITARY REFORM

PETER W. CHAFFIN, MAJOR, USA
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

NEWPORT, RI

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY REFORM

by

PETER W. CHIARELLI, MAJOR, USA

RAYMOND C. GAGNON, JR., MAJOR, USAF

JUNE 1985

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accomplished through the use of three case studies: (1) the establishment of the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense; (2) the current weapon system procurement and spare parts controversy; and (3) efforts concerning Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and Department of Defense reorganization. Finally, having analyzed the dynamics of the military reform movement and the responses it has elicited, the authors propose a new strategy for Department of Defense decision-makers so they may effectively participate in the process. *Key words:*

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Executive Summary of

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY REFORM

The author's contend that in recent years the political power base of the military reform movement has grown significantly. In the future its influence on defense policy-making is likely to increase. This study analyzes the politics of military reform but does not judge specific reform proposals or tactics.

The study does, however, provide national defense decision-makers with an informed perspective from which to evaluate the reform movement, its reform proposals, and its implications for defense policy formulation. The reform debate's participants (p. 10), motivations (p. 22), interests (p. 30), strategies (p. 31) and linkages (p. 37) are examined. Additionally, this study provides an analysis of the movement's past, present and future influence on the political process, as it affects defense policy-making.

This analysis is accomplished through a study of the establishment of the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (p. 45); the current weapon systems procurement and spare parts controversy (p. 48); and efforts concerning Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and Department of Defense reorganization (p. 55). Finally, having analyzed the dynamics of the military reform movement and the responses it has elicited from a variety of interest groups, the authors propose a strategy for implementation by Department of Defense decision-makers so that they can more effectively participate in the process rather than be relegated to a reactionary role (p. 65).

The establishment of the Congressional Military Reform Caucus in 1981 marked the initial institutionalization of the reform movement (p. 10). More than 90 Senators and Representatives are members of the current Military Reform Caucus with Republicans holding a slight majority. Other organizations that have furthered the institutionalization of military reform include the Project on Military Procurement (p. 15), Business Executives for National Security (p. 15), and the Military Reform Institute (p. 16). Foundations and institutions formally analyzing specific military reform proposals include Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Heritage Foundation and the Hudson Institute (p. 14).

The passage of legislation establishing an independent Office of Operational Test and Evaluation in 1983 is claimed by the Military Reform Caucus as its first major legislative success (p. 45). The current debate concerning weapon systems procurement and spare parts over-pricing has been fueled by the Project on Military Procurement and Business Executives for National Security (p. 48). The previously identified foundations and institutions sponsored studies dealing primarily with Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and Department of Defense reorganization (p. 55). In the majority of cases those studies were expanded to include other reform proposals as well.

The authors conclude that the reform movement has been effective in selected areas and that organizational linkages have developed (p. 63). Furthermore, many reform proposals are gaining public and Congressional support. The growing appeal of these proposals is aided by concern over record budget deficits and a weakened consensus supporting current levels of defense spending.

The Department of Defense is generally perceived as not adequately evaluating reform proposals or willing to implement reforms mandated by Congress. Consequently, the Department of Defense strategy is characterized as defensive and "stonewalling." This perception has allowed the reformers to set the reform agenda.

Viewing this as a flawed strategy, the authors propose a new Department of Defense strategy based on the following five recommendations (p. 65): (1) the creation of an independent mechanism to evaluate reform proposals; (2) the designation of an individual responsible for coordinating Department of Defense efforts concerning reforms; (3) the establishment of a mechanism that guarantees open lines of communication for career bureaucrats and military officers to surface alternative solutions to Department of Defense management problems; (4) the employment of steps so that the Department of Defense will be able to fully understand the impact of the changing dynamics of Congress brought about by subtle Congressional rules changes and limited structural reform; and (5) the improvement of the Department of Defense's effectiveness and image by developing the capability and willingness to affix responsibility when mistakes are made.

PREFACE

We would like to thank the Naval War College and its Center for Advanced Research for allowing us the opportunity to take on a project as diverse as "The Politics of Military Reform." The College gave us complete freedom and support as research associates during a four-month period. This product, and the fact that we are both active-duty military officers, should silence those critics who argue that the Services are adverse to allowing their own the academic freedom to critically examine civil-military policy.

Our research relied on more than 70 personal interviews. We would like to thank all who were willing to talk with us. A special thank you goes to Colonel Alan L. Gropman, USAF and Captain Andrew J. Sherbo, USAF for their insight and extremely helpful comments on initial drafts, as well as Captain Sherbo's technical advice concerning various national and defense budget issues. Furthermore, the following individuals provided extensive comments on our first draft: Mr. Frank C. Carlucci, Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF, Dr. James R. Kurth, Dr. Frederick H. Hartmann, Dr. David K. Hall, Dr. Steven T. Ross, Mr. Richard Halloran, Mr. William S. Lind, Mr. Franklin C. Spinney, Mr. Paul Hoven, Lieutenant Colonel Theodore J. Crackel, USA (Retired), Lieutenant Colonel James Stefan, USA, Major Robert C. Chapin, USAF and Major James R. Kerin, Jr. USA. Of course, although they provided valuable assistance, only we should be held responsible for the final product.

The real heroes in a project such as this, however, are the typists who are continually being told "we promise this is the last change, and it's ready to

go final." We are amazed that the professional staff at Columbia Research Corporation, led by Ms. Gwen Ruggeri, will still talk with us. A special thanks goes to Ms. Ruggeri and her assistants, Ms. Rita Larrivee and Ms. Mary Almeida. Finally, we could have never completed this project without the stellar administrative support provided by Ms. Shirley Wilkins of the Center for Advanced Research.

Chapter I

Introduction

Today's calls for reform follow a long-standing tradition in U.S. civil-military relations.¹ Americans from colonial times have examined ways to reform their military. The current effort seems to fall into two broad schools: one wishes to work within the current system and the other outside it.

Within each of these two schools are political appointees, military officers, government employees, Congressmen, defense intellectuals, and private citizens. Some call themselves "reformers" and others are clearly "anti-reformers." The vast majority of the participants in this debate, however, fall somewhere in between. In this study we attempt to group the various players according to how they fall along this continuum. Inevitably, some inadequacies may result, but for the purposes of our research it is essential to somehow frame the debate.

Although it is impossible to craft a universally accepted composite of how the Department of Defense (DoD) views the reformers, many influential DoD players seem to view the "reformers" as a loose-knit group of individuals crusading non-related issues that are minimally supportive of one another. Anti-defense, pro-social spending desires allegedly motivate many of the reformers. Some DoD and military officials believe it is a gross overstatement to attribute the term "reform movement" to such a band of

nay-sayers and uninformed critics. These officials are quick to deny any significant past, current, or potential effectiveness resulting from reform efforts. Claims of success forced on the defense establishment by the reformers are discounted by defense officials as the result of either self-initiated internal management decisions or intrusions upon DoD prerogatives.

The reformers are quick to counter that they are following a long and established tradition of Congressional and non-Congressional concern for defense policy-making. Although they tend to view and prioritize the problems from different perspectives, they see the issues as cumulative, related, and increasingly mutually supportive.

Some reformers have labeled themselves "cheap hawks"² and all point with pride to their role in the passage of legislation establishing the independent office of Operational Test and Evaluation within the Pentagon.* Credit is also claimed for recent DoD and Service initiatives and legislation that call for (1) increased competition; (2) warranties within the weapon system and spare-parts acquisition process;** and (3) increased acceptance of "maneuver" warfare.***

Because they see a growing constituency critical of continued high levels

*Final vote in the Senate was 91 to 5 in favor of establishing OT&E. It was passed in the House of Representatives by voice vote.

**Legislative amendments adopted in 1984 exempt the bulk of the Pentagon's weapons buying from the warranty process.³

***Increased acceptance of maneuver warfare is illustrated by Major General Al Gray's work with the 2nd Marine Division and the Army and Air Force joint Airland Battle Doctrine (Army FM 100-5, Operations.)

of defense spending, some Congressional members want to be "seen as tough on defense" and viewed as catering to those arguing for fewer guns during a period of even less butter.⁴ Others recognize the political imperative of assuring the public that the unprecedented growth in defense spending is necessary and is being managed wisely. There are several factors arguing in favor of both perspectives of the reform movement.

DoD's view is supported by the inability of the Military Reform Caucus (MRC)* to generate a cohesive statement of goals and objectives. Additionally, it views the public as strongly supportive of the Administration's multi-year plan for rebuilding America's defenses. Viewing itself as the true expert in defense priorities, it holds an important advantage over critics since it maintains control over classified defense information. By manipulating or withholding pertinent information, whatever reforms evolve, DoD can direct or influence. Those inefficiencies that it is unable to correct are more than likely blamed on the Congressional budgeting process. Many in DoD view with suspicion the political motives of Congressmen who won't allow base closings or defense project cancellations employing constituents in their home districts. The problem is exacerbated by the participation of 535 such players.

Those calling for reform, however, counter that the consensus for sustaining current levels of defense spending is crumbling. Revelations in recent years of alleged abuses within the DoD procurement system e.g., \$7,600

*Established in 1981, the Military Reform Caucus is a bipartisan group of legislators comprised of members from both the House and Senate. For more information see Chapter 3.

coffee pots and \$500 claw hammers⁵—are cited as evidence that reform is needed. Pressures brought upon the defense and national budgets by large deficits only fuel the public debate. The reformers are quick to point out that increased defense spending is buying fewer systems⁶ and question the quality, maintainability, and reliability of those systems.

Although the principal advocates of sweeping reforms are found outside the formal defense community, increasing numbers of DoD employees are calling for changes that support some reform proposals.⁷ Moreover, heightened debate over JCS/DoD reform has lent credibility to the accusation that there is little relation between weapons procurement and strategy development.⁸

Given that the preceding discussion outlines views held by participants at the extremes of the spectrum, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the political implications of the military reform movement. The authors hope to provide national defense decision-makers with an informed perspective from which to evaluate the reform movement, its reform proposals, and their implications for defense policy formulation. The reform debate's participants, motivations, interests, strategies and linkages will be examined. Additionally, an analysis of the movement's past, present and future influence on the political process, as it affects defense policy-making, will be provided. Finally, having analyzed the dynamics of the military reform movement and the responses it has elicited, we will propose a strategy for DoD decision-makers to implement so that they can more effectively participate in the process rather than be relegated to a reactionary role.

This study does not attempt to evaluate reform proposals such as "quantity versus quality." We will not comment on whether JCS reform will result in a Prussian General Staff or diminish civilian control of the military. Additionally, we will not attempt to judge reformer methods such as their willingness to proceed outside of normal chains of authority, use of the media, or reliance upon organizations that "leak" official documents to the public.

It is our contention that the political power base of the reform movement has grown in recent years and will continue to have increasing political influence on defense policy making. Therefore, we will analyze the politics of military reform, keeping in mind what a well-known political scientist, E.E. Schattschneider, once observed: "...sooner or later it becomes necessary...in any political system to discriminate among the demands. This involves the establishment of a public policy."⁹

Chapter II

Reform Movement History

Tradition of Reform

Civilian leaders in this country have reformed the military more often than they have sent it into battle. Many who follow today's reform movement, however, consider it unprecedented in the history of civil-military relations in the United States. While certain elements of the current debate may be unique, its existence is not.

Elihu Root, a leading corporation lawyer from New York, was appointed Secretary of War by President McKinley in 1899. The U.S. had won the Spanish American War, yet many believed the military had been inefficient. Although not totally supported by the Army leadership of the time, the "Root Reforms" are seen today as long needed steps that were required to modernize the Army. They included the abolition of permanent assignments to staff posts in Washington, the revival of the special service schools, the creation of an Army War College, and the replacement of the commanding general by a chief of staff.

Those who argue that meaningful reform stems only from defeat in war forget that the National Security Act of 1947, probably the most comprehensive defense reform in U.S. history, was the result of lessons learned during our greatest victory. In 1961 it was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, past president of The Ford Motor Company, who used the amended 1947 act to

bring a centralized management system to the Pentagon. The Services resented McNamara and his "Whiz Kids," viewing them as "amateurs," a label often applied to today's reformers.

Current Movement

The roots of the current movement extend back to the mid-1970s when an increasing number of defense intellectuals began discussing the three broad topics of doctrine, procurement and force structure. Organizational issues such as DoD and JCS reform were not high on the early reform agenda.

Although William S. Lind asserts that the reform movement of 1985 grew from a core of five individuals,* in fact the increased popularity of reform today is due in part to the work of people not formally associated with the reform movement. Specifically, the work of Dr. Edward N. Luttwak (Strategy and Politics), Russell F. Weigley (The American Way of War), Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage (Crisis in Command) and C.V. Curry (Self-Destruction) supported many reform proposals.

The establishment of the Military Reform Caucus (MRC) in 1981 marked the initial institutionalization of the reform movement. Two factors facilitated this process. Initially it was Senator Gary Hart's (D-CO) 1981 Wall Street Journal article outlining the need for reform of the U.S. military.¹ that caught in particular the attention of Representative G. William Whitehurst (R-VA). As a conservative, Whitehurst was amazed to learn he shared similar

*The five persons cited by Lind include beside himself, Norman Polmar (Naval Expert), Steven Canby (Force Structure Expert), John Boyd (Author of "Patterns of Conflict Briefing") and Pierre Sprey (Quantity vs. Quality).

concerns with his neo-liberal Senate colleague over the need for military reform. This precipitated Whitehurst's call to Hart, which resulted in a bipartisan meeting of legislators concerned with these same issues.²

The second factor, which saw the establishment of a formal caucus, was more the result of Congressional rules changes than any desire to have a formal Congressional caucus. These changes reduced the power of party leadership, weakened the seniority system and caused a proliferation of Congressional caucuses. As a practical matter, the new rules required that Congressional caucuses be formally organized in order to obtain franking privileges.³

For a majority of the charter members, the caucus was never intended to establish a binding platform for reform. Rather, it was meant to be an informal bipartisan forum for discussing, thinking, and learning about defense issues. Even the choice of the title of "Military Reform" Caucus was the result of the necessity to have a formal name, rather than an attempt to embrace the proposals championed by the previously mentioned defense intellectuals.*

As important as the choice of the name Military Reform Caucus would prove to be, William S. Lind's position as Senator Hart's defense aide was a critical factor in DoD's initial response to the caucus. Prior to joining Hart's staff, Lind authored Senator Robert Taft, Jr's (R-OH) 1976 White Paper

*Representative Whitehurst's Military Liaison Assistant also stated that the choice of the term Reform was undoubtedly a reason behind the negative reaction of OSD and the Services to establishment of the caucus. She called it "an unfortunate choice of words."⁴

on Defense. Among other things, it called for a large cut in the Army budget in order to fund a naval build-up consisting of small VSTOL carriers and a large diesel and nuclear submarine force.⁵

At the same time Pierre Sprey was calling for less sophisticated and larger quantities of Air Force fighter aircraft. Both Lind and Sprey gave the caucus information briefs soon after it was organized. This, coupled with Lind's and Sprey's sometimes abrasive personalities, saw DoD's and the Services' reaction to the establishment of the caucus shaped more by Lind's attitude, his associates, and past writings than by the issues the caucus chose to discuss. In addition, some of the caucus's initial proposals, when made public, caused the defense establishment to view the caucus as an "internal threat" to continued public and Congressional support for increases in defense spending.⁶ Specifically, some of the reform criticisms that shaped the initial DoD response to the movement were viewed as challenges to (1) the American military's ability to "win"; (2) the competence of military leadership; and (3) the previously accepted military monopoly of expertise in the art of war. Finally, this movement included not only the traditional critics of defense policy (Congressional liberals), but also many conservatives whom the Pentagon had previously relied upon for support.

Chapter III

Today's Debate

Today, the Military Reform Caucus (MRC) is only one of many organizations involved with defense reform issues. Several corollary organizations have developed in Washington that augment and assist reformers in pursuing their goals. These organizations have frequently grown as a result of the independent interests of their founders rather than as a result of any coordinated reform efforts. Subsequently, mutual support on a specific issue is provided as much by chance as by the result of any coordinated effort.

This process has been aided by continually escalating budget deficits, allegations of spare parts abuses, the on-going debate of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reform, and the growing popularity of investigative reporting. All these factors have significantly broadened the constituency and the potential political power base favoring military reform. Consequently, this chapter will address the actors, motivations, interests, strategies and the linkages of the participants in the reform debate.

Actors--Congress

The primary activity identified with military reform in Congress is the MRC. The caucus prides itself in being a bicameral, bipartisan group "that doesn't concentrate on either budget cuts or budget increases."¹ It has grown from 16 members in the fall of 1981,² to more than 90 members during

the current 99th Congress.³ With no formal staff, the MRC depends upon the existing staff of its House and Senate co-chairs--who rotate with each new session of Congress. It is noteworthy that during the 98th Congress both MRC co-chairs, Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KA) and Representative James Courter (R-NJ) are members of the Republican Party.⁴

Caucus membership is almost evenly split between the parties, with Republicans currently holding a slight advantage of 48 members to the Democrats' 43.⁵ Participation includes legislators from both ends of the political spectrum, as illustrated by caucus members Senator Jeremiah Denton (R-AL) from the right and Representative Barbara Boxer (D-CA) from the left.

Conservative membership in the MRC, as well as within Congress as a whole, has changed in recent years. In the past, conservatives were characterized as being strong supporters of national defense and more likely to support those programs endorsed by the Department of Defense (DoD). They remain rigorous supporters of a strong defense, but are more likely to question priorities established by the Pentagon across the broad spectrum of defense issues. Representative Newt Gingrich (R-GA), an active member of the MRC, prides himself on being labeled a "cheap hawk".* He indicates that a growing number of conservative members, both within and outside the MRC, are willing to accept this characterization of their stand on defense issues.⁷

The six most important committees relative to defense issues remain the Armed Services, Appropriations, and Budget committees of each house.

*"Cheap hawk" is a term used to describe an individual traditionally supportive of Pentagon programs, but seriously concerned about escalating defense costs.⁶

Historically, the Armed Services Committees have been considered strongly supportive of the Pentagon and the recognized Congressional authorities on defense matters. However, changes in the Congressional budgeting system in the last 10 years (primarily the establishment of the Congressional Budget Office in 1974) have increased the role of the Appropriations and Budget Committees as overseers of the defense budget. The Congressional Budget Office has given Congress an independent capability to analyze the President's defense budget.

J. David Willson, a staff member on the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, calls the committee "the department of negative thinking and skepticism" in order to ensure that defense dollars are spent wisely. As "questioners of the budget," he states, staff members are recruited based on their professional budget experience; and the current staff has little or no military experience.⁸ Willson insisted that Congress, as well as the House Appropriations Committee, believes that we need a strong national defense. The staff's role, however, is to ensure that current programs will be affordable in the future. He sees the forces working against this imperative to be the defense contractors, subcontractors and military Services.⁹

An important development in the committee system during recent sessions of Congress has been a proliferation of committees that added defense issues to their agenda. Congressional members not belonging to a committee with traditional defense oversight believe this allows the review of those issues that the Armed Services Committees have been reluctant to address.¹⁰ Subsequently, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, chaired by Senator William V. Roth, Jr. (R-DE), gained national notoriety with its 1983 "Spare

Parts Christmas Tree."¹¹ Ornaments on the tree were overpriced spare parts with an affixed tag indicating the price DoD had been charged.

Furthermore, the Senate Small Business Committee went so far as to form a subcommittee on defense procurement. In an attempt to regain the initiative, the Senate Armed Services Committee will have its own Defense Procurement Subcommittee in the 99th Congress.

With the increase in the volume and complexity of issues that today's Congressman is forced to address, the role his staff plays has been greatly expanded. Nowhere is this more evident than in the discussion of defense issues. William S. Lind's influence on the defense attitudes of Senator Hart is well-documented.¹² John Heybusch, Legislative Aide to Representative Denny Smith (R-OR), did much of the research and investigation that resulted in recent Congressional criticism of the Army's DIVAD air defense weapon system.¹³

Because of limits on the size of professional staffs, few Congressmen can afford to have an aide solely dedicated to one issue. Nonetheless, many legislators do have a staffer with a title such as "military liaison assistant" or "national security affairs assistant." His or her primary duty is to closely follow defense issues.

The current bull market for people knowledgeable of defense matters has been magnified by the requirement for staffers on the various committees and subcommittees that deal in military matters. For example, C. Lincoln Hoewing, professional staff member for the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, is becoming a noted expert on the defense procurement system and is representative of fellow staff members in the House and Senate. Hoewing

recently wrote a Heritage Foundation Background, "Improving the Way the Pentagon Acquires its Weapons."¹⁴

Private Organizations

The growth in private organizations concentrating all or part of their resources on military matters is another indicator of the increased importance placed on defense issues. Two broad headings characterize these organizations: (1) research organizations or foundations and (2) advocacy groups that may be either pro- or anti-reform.

Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The Heritage Foundation, and the Hudson Institute are representative of those in the first group. These groups tend to concern themselves with organizational rather than specific procurement issues. The professional staffs of some foundations employ a significant number of former high-level government officials as well as retired flag officers.¹⁵ Additionally, for specific studies, such as CSIS's recent Defense Organization Project and The Heritage Foundation's Defense Assessment Project, both current and past government and military leaders are asked to serve as consultants.* Many of these individuals may return to government service after working with these organizations.

*Some of the panel members serving on the CSIS Defense Organization Project are General Andrew Goodpaster, Melvin Laird, General David Jones, Admiral Harry Train, Senator Sam Nunn, and James Woolsey. Additionally, members of The Heritage Foundations' Defense Assessment Project's Advisory Group Included Richard Allen, General Edward Meyer, and General Daniel Graham.¹⁶

Concerning defense reform, advocacy groups can generally be identified as either pro- or anti-reform. The development and organization of pro-reform advocacy groups has taken place only in the last few years. Their existence has considerably broadened the political base of those seeking major reform. The most significant of these groups include:

1. Project on Military Procurement (PMP)--Founded by Dina Rasor in 1981, the project has an annual budget of \$200,000. Contributors to PMP's budget include the Ruth Mott Foundation, the Gannett Community Fund and the Rockefeller Family Fund.* It is characterized by Rasor and DoD officials alike as a safehouse for whistle-blowers. Composed of five investigative reporters, PMP's charter states that its short-term goal is "to educate the press, the public, and the Congress on on-going fraud and waste in the Pentagon."¹⁸ The charter goes on to state that PMP's long-term goal is "to reform the Pentagon procurement system in order to provide an effective and reliable defense of our country at less expense to the U.S. taxpayer."¹⁹ PMP is established as a non-profit educational organization, prohibited by law from lobbying activities.

2. Business Executives for National Security (BENS)--Constituted as a "trade association" in 1982, BENS' goal according to Michael Burns, BENS' legislative director--is "to influence defense policy so that how we go about

*PMP officials state that the Rockefeller Family Fund has supported the project with substantial contributions since it was organized. Other foundation contributors for 1984 include Samuel Ruben, Scherman, Field, Norman, Tides, Ploughshare, as well as the Fund for Constitutional Government and the Belden Fund. Private contributions were received from Wade Greene, Jay Harris, and W.F. and Carol Ferry.¹⁷

providing for defense does not impact negatively on American business."²⁰ BENS' officials claim that prior to their establishment, the business community did not have an organization to evaluate the DoD budget or procurement policies. They also state that "BENS represents the 13 million businesses that do not partake in DoD contracts as opposed to the 23,000 who do."²¹ Asked what is the top concern of BENS' 2,500 members, their legislative director stated, "they have a sense that an awful lot of dollars are going in [to the defense budget], but they're not sure that what's coming out is worth it."²² Unlike other pro-reform advocacy groups, BENS has members in every state--and a declared goal of at least one member in every Congressional district.

3. Military Reform Institute (MRI)--Established in 1983 by William S. Lind, Steven Canby, Jeffrey Record and Norman Polmar, the stated purpose of MRI is to "assist in the task of bringing our defense policies and priorities back into line with what is needed for winning in combat."²³ Eventually, MRI hopes to publish a quarterly journal that will allow the professional officer corps a "new open forum to present innovative ideas" concerning reform issues.²⁴

Anti-reform advocacy groups include many defense contractors, trade associations and what are commonly called military lobby associations. Of this latter group, some of the most prominent are the Air Force Association (AFA), the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), and the Navy League of the United States. Their advocacy for the programs supported by the Services they represent results in frequent disagreements with those who call for reform.

It is perhaps unfair to attempt to categorize all defense contractors as anti-reform. They find themselves in the unenviable position of relying on DoD contracts for all, or at least most of, their livelihood. At the same time, they rely upon Congress as the final approval authority for defense contracts. Consequently, they are unwilling to take a public position either for or against reform. Nonetheless, they have a vested interest in maintaining a "business as usual" atmosphere. Whatever position an individual defense contractor may have for or against reform, it will normally be channeled through a trade association. This technique is used in order to protect a contractor from becoming a "lightning rod."²⁵ Examples of such organizations include the Electronics Industry Association (EIA) and the National Security Industry Association (NSIA). Groups such as EIA and NSIA rely upon employees of member corporations to participate in association sponsored panels to research and present the "industry position" on various defense issues.

--Journalists and Media

Any attempts to build constituencies outside the Washington, D.C. area, either in support of reform proposals or current DoD policies, rely heavily on the media to bring the message to the American people. Richard Halloran, since 1979 the lead defense reporter for The New York Times, stated that the increased interest in post-Vietnam defense reporting began with the SALT II negotiations. Events that have sustained the public interest include:

(1) the Soviet Brigade in Cuba in 1978; (2) the taking of American hostages in Teheran in November 1979; (3) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December

1979; (4) the Iranian hostage rescue attempt ("Desert One") in April 1980; (5) the American downing of two Libyan SU-15s in May 1982; and (6) the American operation in Grenada in October 1983.²⁶

Public interest in an expanding defense budget, and a concern about large deficits are also reasons for the expansion of media coverage of military-related stories.* Since Watergate, journalists have become increasingly interested in investigative or what some call "enterprise," reporting. Since DoD possesses the largest portion of discretionary spending in the national budget, it has become fertile ground for those plying this particular craft.

The following data on controllability and non-controllability of federal outlays (defense versus non-defense) illustrates this point:

Percent of Total Federal Outlays
Considered Relatively Controllable.

<u>FY</u>	<u>Total Federal</u>	<u>Defense</u>	<u>Non-Defense</u>
80	30%	50%	24%
81	29%	57%	21%
82	28%	65%	15%
83	28%	71%	13%
84	29%	65%	15%
85 (est)	29%	64%	16%
86 (est)	26%	62%	11%

SOURCE: Budget of the United States Government FY 1986
4 Feb 85. Table 18, pages 9-44 - 9-45; and
Table 20, page 9-56.

The data clearly shows that defense spending under Reagan has become more "controllable." The total defense budget has continued to grow with a 14

*Halloran stated that in the five years he has been in Washington, the number of reporters covering "the defense beat" for The New York Times has increased from one to five. "Just six months ago the Business Section Editor, in New York, sent Wayne Biddle to Washington to cover defense primarily for the Business Page."²⁷

percent annual growth in current dollars since FY 81 (last Carter budget) through FY 85. This compares to only a seven percent annual growth in total non-defense spending over the same period. Non-defense reductions have reduced the percent of non-defense spending which is now considered to be "relatively controllable."*

This indicates that Congress has substantially reduced the controllable portion of non-defense spending through reductions in non-defense programs. Thus, even a smaller percent of non-defense spending is now considered controllable (i.e., some would argue we are down to the minimum in cuts on non-defense programs).

---Establishment

Institutionally, what is frequently called the Establishment (e.g., the Administration, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Military Departments, JCS and the Services) can be characterized as "anti-reform." There are individual members of establishment organizations, however, who are very much in favor of reform--or at least advocate an objective analysis of reform proposals. For example, Maurice N. Shriber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Spares Program Management, advocates an open dialogue with reform advocates. He recently met with Dina Rasor, Director of the Project on Military Procurement to initiate such dialogue.²⁸ Additionally, William S.

*"Relatively controllable" spending may be defined as federal spending which is endogenous (i.e., dependent) to the annual appropriations process. Trust fund expenditures (e.g., Social Security) is a good example of funds that can be spent without annual approval by the U.S. Congress. Such expenditures are considered "relatively uncontrollable."

Lind has consistently claimed that the greatest support within the Services for maneuver warfare comes from junior officers.²⁹

For the most part, the White House has steered clear of becoming involved in the reform debate. Politically, the Administration views it as important that it not become involved in issues such as spare parts controversies and criticisms of individual weapon systems not meeting design specifications, e.g., DIVAD and ROLAND. By referring negative press and criticism on these subjects to DoD, White House officials limit their vulnerability to adverse political fallout. The White House, through the National Security Council, is more likely to become involved in organizational issues such as JCS or DoD reorganization. The National Security Council is currently active in following the debate over JCS reform and DoD reorganization and is sorting out the President's various interests and determining how they can best be protected.³⁰

OSD is composed of political appointees, career bureaucrats, and military officers. Political appointees are concerned with devising the programs necessary to rebuild America's defenses, thus fulfilling the mandate they claim was given them during the 1980 and 1984 Presidential elections. Many OSD career bureaucrats view the Reagan Administration as providing them the opportunity to enact the programs considered too expensive during previous administrations.* Both groups consider the reform movement a threat to

*Some in the military appear to hold this view as well. Specifically, a source requesting anonymity relayed the comments of one senior general who stated at a meeting shortly after the 1980 election, "We don't care what reformers say [on cost overruns]. The American public has just mandated an increase in defense spending and we are going to do just that."

maintaining public and Congressional support for a strong defense.*

Much like their counterparts in OSD, political appointees within the military departments view themselves as responsible for fulfilling the mandate for creating a strong defense. Because many of the reform proposals are targeted at a specific Service, however, the military departments have been somewhat more active in the debate. For example, the Navy has taken the lead in defending America's reliance upon nuclear powered versus diesel-electric powered submarines.

The uniformed Services, and their respective Service chiefs, have much in common with the establishment groups previously discussed. In addition, as professional military, they view themselves as the legitimate architects of defense policy. They resent that most calls for reform come from individuals who, as Lieutenant General John T. Chain, Jr., USAF, currently Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, claims "do not have combat experience or even military backgrounds."³¹

Within most of the aforementioned groups, there are many who either publicly or privately advocate the serious addressal of reform proposals. This group includes senior military officers (both active duty and retired),

*Some of the most candid comments concerning the threat posed by the reform movement were so unprofessional that our judgement dictates we treat them as "off-the-record." For example, when discussing the reform movement, and it became known that we had talked with staff members at the Project on Military Procurement and Representative Gingrich (R-GA) one DoD official stated, "I don't want to talk to anyone who's been talking to the Project on Military Procurement" adding later "Gingrich does not know enough about defense to reform anything."

career bureaucrats such as A. Ernest Fitzgerald and Franklin C. Spinney,* and many individuals who during the performance of their assigned duties have taken actions viewed as supportive of the reformers.³² While many of these people are members of the reform camp, still others are merely doing what their education, training and conscience dictate--and would take exception to being called "military reformers."

DoD's reaction to employees who have been publically supportive of reform (e.g., Fitzgerald and Spinney) forced many others to become "closet patriots."³³ So-called "closet patriots" provide information covertly (to avoid retribution) to organizations such as PMP, the media, or even Congress. The total number of "closet patriots" is no doubt underestimated by DoD and overestimated by those who rely on them for information. Nonetheless, our research strongly suggests their numbers have increased in recent years.

Motivators--Congress

Regardless of their stand on reform, the overwhelming majority of Congressmen have defense concerns, though there is significant disagreement on the methods and funding levels required for an "adequate" defense. Although many Congressmen critical of Pentagon policies are members of the MRC, some of the more vocal critics have chosen to remain outside the caucus. Two examples include Senator William V. Roth, Jr. (R-DE) and Representative Les Aspin

*Fitzgerald exposed cost overruns on the C-5A program in the late 1960's and was fired from DoD in 1970. Through court action he has since returned to DoD employment. Spinney authored Defense Facts of Life in 1980 and briefed his Plans/Reality Mismatch to Congress in 1983 and 1984.

(D-WS). Reasons range from not wanting to be labeled a "cheap hawk"³⁴ to a belief that they are already well-informed on defense issues.³⁵ Others agree with DoD's assessment that the MRC has been ineffective and believe that their legislative energies are better spent elsewhere.³⁶


The MRC, as a microcosm of Congress, has members who are advocates of a strong defense and generally supportive of military spending, and others who are using the MRC as a vehicle, to cut defense spending. Where members of the caucus differ with Congress as a whole is that MRC participants, regardless of their motivations, are opposed to continuing with "business as usual" at the Pentagon.

Concerned that the upward economic trends of the previous Reagan Administration may be endangered, many Congressmen desire to be perceived as "budget conscious" and "fiscally smart." The two previous Congresses, in an attempt to reduce government spending, cut some growth in social programs while increasing defense outlays. During the current Congress, however, it is quite possible that even Republican conservatives will be unwilling to support defense spending levels submitted by the Administration--and may even call for a freeze on defense spending.³⁷ Correct or not, there is a growing perception by Congress and the public alike that social spending has been reduced as much as possible and that any future assault on the deficit will require defense cuts.

Significant cuts in defense spending might require the reduction or cancellation of many large weapon system contracts. Additionally, an alteration to the military retirement system or base closings may be required

as well. These may present unacceptable political choices for many Congressmen. DoD understands that it is to its advantage to let contracts in as many Congressional districts as possible. The chart below illustrates this point.

Defense Contracting
(Prime Contract Awards Over \$10,000 - FY 1982 % by Region)



SOURCE: Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1985 (Washington: Government Printing Office) 1 February 1984, p. 93.

Futhermore, contractors realize that they can build a constituency for individual systems by subcontracting in the same manner.* The trend toward high technology weapons has exacerbated this situation.

—Private Organizations

Research foundations devote much of their energies to analyzing future threats to national security and designing strategies to counter them. They believe that levels of defense spending should be driven by the threat and are generally independent of national economic considerations. In the past, their strategic orientation precluded them from addressing procurement policy or entering debates over choosing conventional systems.

Some defenders of the status quo view pro-reform advocacy groups as anti-defense and unpatriotic. They view them as motivated by a desire to cut defense spending regardless of its effect on national security. There are undoubtedly some members of the reform movement who are motivated by just such concerns and believe that current levels of defense spending are a threat to peace or the economy or both. Certainly there are those who believe that alternative (e.g., social spending, debt reduction measures, or foreign aid) avenues for defense dollars should be pursued.

Our research indicates, however, that many pro-reform groups are motivated by the same concerns enunciated by their opposition. Generally, they want to ensure that we get sufficient "bang for the buck." Specifically:

*Both the F-18 Fighter Aircraft and B-1 Bomber are often cited examples of expensive weapons systems subcontracted out to over 40 states. Senator Allen Cranston (D-CA), long an advocate of a "nuclear freeze," voted for building the B-1, many argue, because the contractor is headquartered in California.

1. Project on Military Procurement (PMP): PMP questions whether reliance on high technology systems will counter Soviet numerical superiority. Additionally, PMP is not convinced that sufficient national security is being provided for the dollars invested. By exposing inefficient and more importantly ineffective weapon systems and procurement practices, PMP hopes to challenge DoD and Congress into acquiring better systems. Their goal is not "swords into plowshares" but rather "better swords."

2. Business Executives for National Security (BENS): Among other things, BENS members are motivated by a belief that sound business practices are ignored in the defense sector. They are strong supporters of legislation that would bring increased competition and warranties to defense procurement. A majority of BENS members head privately owned companies and see high interest rates, propelled by a continued large deficit, as a threat to future business expansion.³⁸ Consequently, they see many of the reform proposals as supportive of their goals.

3. Military Reform Institute (MRI): They see growing public concern and Congressional interest in reform proposals as an opportunity to further institutionalize the reform movement. William S. Lind states, "we're tired of losing in combat" and cites that as a motivation for founding MRI.³⁹ Because MRI is well-connected with many of the legislators involved in the Military Reform Caucus, MRI officials see their organization as serving as a surrogate staff for the MRC (within the legal limits imposed by their non-profit status). This would give them the opportunity to set the agenda for future MRC initiatives. Finally, believing that senior military leadership does not accurately reflect the strength of the reform movement in

today's officer corps, they hope their quarterly journal will provide a forum for junior officers to debate such issues.⁴⁰

Conversely, advocacy groups taking an anti-reform tack have a vested financial interest in maintaining the status quo. Additionally, they see the acceptance of reform proposals as a threat to rebuilding America's defenses. As products of the system, they tend to view DoD and the individual Services as the legitimate architects of U.S. defense policy. They resent the intrusion of militarily inexperienced "amateurs" and view Congress as primarily responsible for many inefficiencies in the system. Many anti-reformers, given the choice, would opt for Congressional reform rather than military reform.

Finally, there appears to be a tendency to confuse calls for military reform with periodic attacks on military benefits. This is particularly true for groups whose membership is largely composed of retired military. Lieutenant General Richard L. West, USA (Retired), a Senior Associate at the Association of the U.S. Army states:

Service oriented publications typically build their circulation around reports on two annual campaigns: first, headlining the attacks on benefits; and second, recounting the threats to the next, inflation prompted, pay hike.⁴¹

Given this orientation, it is not surprising that readers of these publications often confuse calls by "reformers" to cut the defense budget with calls to reform the military retirement system.

--Journalists and Media

Military reform becomes a good story when it addresses issues that the public can relate to. While the general public may or may not think the first

Aegis cruiser, which cost approximately \$1 billion, was worth it, revelations of \$500 claw hammers get their attention. In the past, stories concerning strategy, DoD reorganization and JCS reform attracted only a limited readership; however, in recent months public interest has increased.⁴²

Weapon systems that don't live up to expectations are often reported as weapon systems that "don't work." Consequently, they become self-nominating targets for investigative reporters, and as such draw considerable public interest.

The majority of the public can identify with a whistle-blower attempting to expose an alleged wrong within the system. Frequently, it is the media that provides the forum for the "one guy against the bureaucracy" battle that ensues.

--Establishment

Those members of the establishment who are critical of reform are motivated by the belief that defense elites, through experience, training, and access to intelligence information, are best able to determine defense policy direction. Since they work with the system on a daily basis, they think they are better able to comprehend the dynamics involved--much more so than part-time critics who make recommendations based on limited and very specific information.

Given the defense build-up during the last four years, there is a strong incentive to maintain the status quo as defined by the current Administration. Some would say it has given DoD almost all that it has requested. A public debate over reform would have the effect of weakening the consensus supporting the continued financing of a strong defense.

Additionally, many of the political appointees currently serving in the Administration, OSD and the military departments have political aspirations beyond their current position. Consequently, they are reluctant to become involved in a debate in which their participation could lend credibility to charges that they have been poor stewards of public resources. Finally, there are those anti-reform establishment players who have studied reform proposals and arguments and firmly believe them to be wrong.

Those members of the establishment who are willing to enter the reform debate, either publicly or privately, are motivated by many factors. Some, like Franklin C. Spinney, were influenced by reform advocates during their early professional years.⁴³ As a young USAF captain at the Pentagon, Spinney worked for Colonel John Boyd, who is viewed by many to be the intellectual architect of the current reform movement. Others, both civilian and military, found in the performance of their job inadequacies in the system that confirmed reform criticisms. Yet others, who have never even heard of the reform movement, have become inadvertant supporters of reform once exposed to apparent excesses of waste and abuse.* Finally, there are those who are critical of many reform proposals but believe that continuation of the debate is imperative. They believe that the strength of the American system is that it not only allows such criticism, but actually encourages it through our constitutional process.⁴⁵ They are not threatened by such discussions and believe critics force the system to reevaluate itself.

*Most of the whistle-blowers, so critical in providing information to the Project on Military Procurement, have never heard of the Military Reform Movement.⁴⁴

Interests

In addition to the interests of the various actors mentioned previously, there are other actor interests as well. Both those for and against reform share at least two common interests. First, all see a need for an "adequate" defense. Second, all would agree that there are some inefficiencies in the system. Disagreement develops when a discussion evolves into what precisely is an adequate defense and how severe are the inefficiencies within DoD.

A common reform movement criticism is that strategy is not the determining factor driving force structure and weapon system acquisition decisions. Since the inception of the debate, some reformers have been searching for a way to educate the public about the importance of strategic decisions.⁴⁶ Their inability to do this has forced them to seek the public's interest through debates over the defense budget.

That debate has led them to conclude that meaningful reform will have to be imposed from outside DoD. They argue that the Pentagon is incapable of "reforming" itself from within. Therefore, they see a need for increased public and Congressional oversight of DoD policy making that will lead to more wisely and honestly constructed defense budgets.

Although DoD has been forced to recognize the requirements for some limited reforms (e.g., spare parts procurement and operational testing and evaluation), it continues to strive to maintain its autonomy. Historically, OSD and the Services have vigorously guarded their authority to maintain control over the procurement and resource allocation processes.⁴⁷ They have become more firmly entrenched in this desire during the current debate.

These concerns have been heightened over the current reformers' desire to propose alternatives to current doctrine.⁴⁸ Challenges to the military elites' authority in these areas often elicits a response because they take "reform" criticism both personally and professionally.

Strategies--Reformers

The bipartisan nature of the Military Reform Caucus, coupled with the political considerations inherent in defense spending, significantly affects its strategy for reform. Historically, there has been a general desire, both in the caucus and Congress as a whole to attack "process" rather than specific "systems."⁴⁹ Therefore, the caucus (not to be confused with individual caucus members) does not target specific weapon systems for elimination from the budget, even when those systems are plagued with cost overruns and/or do not meet design specifications.

In order to avoid "pork barrel" issues, the caucus tends to advocate changing the process through which those systems were developed. Strong caucus and Congressional support for the establishment of the Office of Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) within OSD is an example of this strategy.* Ideally, an independent OT&E office would be strong enough to assume the responsibility for cancelling ineffective systems prior to a full production decision. This would spare Congress the politically unpalatable choice of continuing with a "bad" system or terminating one that had already developed a sizeable constituency of Congressional colleagues. The aversion

*Final vote in the Senate was 91 to 5 in favor of establishing OT&E. It passed in the House of Representatives by voice vote.

of the caucus to take a position on individual systems is strong. Indeed, discussion of such weapons is rarely included on caucus agendas.⁵⁰

In situations where Congressional action is required, it is thought that OT&E will provide such overwhelming evidence supporting the ineffectiveness of the system in question that Congress, as a whole, will be able to stop its production. Congressional desire to further affect process rather than policy is reflected in the caucus's support for legislation requiring warranties and increased competition.

Since legislation enacting OT&E is the only significant achievement for which the caucus can claim credit, many within the establishment have discounted the effectiveness of Congressional reformers. Representative Gingrich is quick to point out, however, that, in order to build the political constituency required to change the process, the caucus must employ "guerrilla tactics rather than a main force attack."⁵¹ Representative Gingrich contends "that the attrition mind-set of DoD makes it impossible for them to understand or effectively deal with such tactics."⁵²

Two changes allegedly resulting from such tactics include recent OSD-imposed organizational changes and a limited acceptance of maneuver warfare by the Army and Marine Corps. Examples of OSD organizational changes include the establishment of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Spares Program Management in December 1984 as well as the creation in January 1985 of two new Assistant Secretary of Defense positions: one for Acquisition Management and the other for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. These examples illustrate Gingrich's contention since they were not the result of legislation. Instead, they were precipitated by pressures placed upon OSD

over a significant period of time not only by Congress, but by the media, reform organizations, and to some extent even the public. Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Installations and Logistics), stated that the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Management was announced because it was felt something had to be done, not because of a strong conviction that such an organizational change would ensure meaningful corrections to the acquisition process.⁵³

Conservative members of the MRC attribute the inactivity of the caucus in the six months prior to the November 1984 election as a conscious decision to downplay the need for reform so that the Democratic Party could not make it a major issue during the campaign. It was feared that if spare parts abuses and systems that "don't work" became major campaign issues, Republicans in Congress might have been forced to defend apparent fraud, waste and abuse. They predict, however, that the caucus will be an active and effective participant in the upcoming debate over defense spending.

Without direct access to the legislative process, the Project on Military Procurement (PMP) makes use of a different, yet complementary, strategy to effect reform. In an attempt to raise public and legislative concern, their "efforts are geared to collecting the information of 'closet patriots' who are employed in the Department of Defense or defense industry."⁵⁴

It is significant to note that PMP will only involve itself with unclassified documents. To do otherwise would adversely affect their credibility. The project director, Dina Rasor, states, "we are not and do not want to be viewed as radical, left wing, anti-defense liberals, but rather as concerned citizens fulfilling the role of loyal opposition in regards to

defense spending. To involve ourselves illegally with classified documents, even with the best of motives, would call into question our patriotism."⁵⁵ This is one of the reasons why PMP deals exclusively in critiquing conventional, as opposed to nuclear, systems.

Once written information is received from its sources and confirmed as factual, the project briefs and provides copies to a number of journalists. The journalists are then expected to conduct their own investigations of the allegations and report their findings to the public. To this point PMP has dealt primarily with Washington, D.C.-based media.

At this time the project is working to broaden the base of its public information network by going to state and local media. It is hoped that these new efforts will encourage the growth of public awareness and activity "through the development of multiple local grass-roots movements."⁵⁶

PMP is often criticized by DoD officials for not supporting any weapon systems. Project officials cite two reasons for this strategy. First, they see their job as one of opposition to ineffective and inefficient systems. Second, they state that their public support for "good" systems would, quite frankly, jeopardize the continued financial support of their work by those who want to see the defense budget cut.⁵⁷

Unlike PMP, Business Executives for National Security (BENS) has employed more traditional tactics, which parallel those used by other single-issue interest groups. Although headquartered in Washington, D.C., BENS is attempting to build a nationally based membership. It uses the media and chapter-sponsored conferences and meetings, as well as its quarterly publication Business and National Security Trendline, to disseminate its views

on defense policy. As an incorporated trade association, it actively lobbies Congressional members and their staffs. Currently, BENS' strategy is to build support within the business community to freeze the defense budget at current levels. The National Federation of Independent Businesses has joined BENS in calling for a one-year freeze. BENS also supports a reorganized Department of Defense.⁵⁸

Still in its organizational stage, the Military Reform Institute (MRI) is attempting to secure the financing needed to function as a full-time, non-profit, educational institution. It plans on continuing its evaluations of military operations such as its April 1984 report on "The Grenada Operation."⁵⁹ William S. Lind's past efforts to actively involve "disenchanted junior officers receptive to the reform message" will increase if his plans for MRI are realized.⁶⁰

Research foundations, more than other non-governmental reform agents, use tactics generally accepted by the system. The Georgetown University CSIS Defense Organization Project provides a good example. CSIS took great care in assembling a panel of well established political, military and academic luminaries.* Their mere presence ensured a certain degree of credibility. Once the panel reaches tentative conclusions and recommendations, their product is briefed to civilian and military policy-makers.** Comments on such

*Some of the panel members serving on the CSIS Defense Organization Project are General Andrew Goodpaster, Melvin Laird, General David Jones, Admiral Harry Train, Senator Sam Nunn, and James Woolsey.

**General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (Retired), briefed the Draft CSIS Report to OSD, selected Congressional leaders, and members of the Administration.

briefings are taken back to the panel for their consideration in completing the final report. This aids CSIS in making recommendations that are within the realm of the politically possible, rather than what may be organizationally preferable. In the case of their Defense Organization Project, CSIS even secured the funding necessary to conduct an implementation phase for their recommendations. During this phase they will seek the widest dissemination possible of their report in the hope that their recommendations become law.

—Anti-reformers

Many officials within DoD deny the current or potential capability of the reform movement to significantly affect the way DoD does business. Consequently, they are more likely to ignore reform proposals or charges than to engage in an active dialogue. To date, most interaction that has taken place with reformers can be characterized as defensive and reactive.*

OSD has made extensive use of public relations activities to diffuse reformer criticisms.⁶¹ Only rarely has OSD used its extensive public affairs resources to preclude reform criticism.⁶²

The establishment is willing to support only those changes that they see will not affect their autonomy.** They strive to maintain an environment that

*The 1982 West Point Senior Conference had as its topic "The Defense Reform Debate." This is an exception to the normal DoD practice of only reacting to reform criticism.

**Examples are the recent appointment of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Spares Program Management and the 1984 Army-Air Force 31 Point Memorandum of Understanding.

supports current or higher levels of defense spending.

DoD's response to whistle-blowers, or individuals perceived as working outside the system, has been to deny them continued access to the information upon which they originally made their "charges," terminate their employment, or transfer them.⁶³ Some attempts have even been made to coerce rating officials to downgrade employee performance reports. Franklin C. Spinney's supervisors were allegedly pressured by David Chu, Director of the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, to give Spinney a lower performance rating of "minimally satisfactory" after he testified for the second time before Congress.⁶⁴

Reform criticisms that the current procurement system is plagued by excessive cost, long lead times and systems that are ultimately unresponsive to user requirements seem valid to many within DoD. To circumvent reliance on normal procurement procedures, there appears to be an increased tendency to force priority programs into the "black world" (highly classified) procurement process.⁶⁵ It is believed that use of the black world process will field systems sooner and at less expense than if normal procedures are used.

Linkages--Reformers

The reform movement is a loose and informal coalition of individual actors and organizations whose goals often are mutually supportive of one another. Our research confirms the generally held belief that it is not directed by any single actor or group of individuals. At times, when our research led us to believe that direct linkages were apparent, we were told by the principal that any identified linkage was purely coincidental. Although far from postulating

any grand conspiracy theory, we do believe, however, that an informal cross fertilization of ideas has taken place.

Specific examples of linkages we were able to verify follow.

- For the most part, organizations that address reform issues are non-profit, educational institutions that rely on private and corporate financing. As such, they rely upon similar funding sources such as the Rockefeller Foundation, Ruth Mott Foundation, and various private contributors.⁶⁶

- The Military Reform Institute (MRI) is relying upon the services of two of the fund raisers who secured financing for Senator Gary Hart's recent presidential campaign. Senator Hart, the first co-chair of the Military Reform Caucus, wrote letters to foundations supporting his presidential campaign asking them to assist in the fund-raising activities of MRI.⁶⁷

- There is a definite sharing of information between Congressional staff members and the Project on Military Procurement (PMP). In 1980, Mike Burns, then military affairs assistant to Representative Gingrich, referred a Minneapolis-based defense analyst reporting information on an ineffective weapon system to PMP. Subsequently, the defense analyst, Paul Hoven moved to Washington to become the Deputy Director of PMP.⁶⁸

- In 1982, Mike Burns left Representative Gingrich's staff to eventually become the Legislative Director for the Business Executives for National Security, the position he currently holds.

- More recently, John Heybusch, legislative director for Representative Denny Smith, shared and received information from PMP concerning the DIVAD air defense weapon system.⁶⁹

- Some of the panel members of the CSIS Defense Organization Project are linked to the reform movement. Specifically, three of the five members of Congress on the panel belong to the Military Reform Caucus. The two additional members have been sympathetic and even supportive of many reform proposals.*

- Three of the four Congressional members serving on the Advisory Panel to The Heritage Foundation's Defense Assessment Project also served as panel members on the CSIS Defense Organization Project. Furthermore, all four Congressional members advising The Heritage Foundation are members of the Military Reform Caucus.**

- Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, while Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering), served as an active member of the Advisory Panel for The Heritage Foundation's Defense Assessment Project. Dr. DeLauer is the only senior DoD official who served on a panel studying "reform" issues while still a member of the Administration.

- The Hudson Institute recently released the results of its JCS and DoD reorganization study.⁷⁰ In contrast to the CSIS and The Heritage Foundation studies, the Hudson Institute advocated maintaining the status quo. It is perhaps significant that since 1983, the Center for Naval Analysis (funded by the U.S. Navy) has functioned as a component of the Hudson

*Senators Nunn and Kassebaum and Representative Gingrich are members of the MRC who served as CSIS panelists. Representatives Aspin and Stratton have been critical of defense policy and also served as CSIS panelists.

**Senator Kassebaum, Representatives Gingrich and Courter served on both panels. Representative Whitenurst only served on The Heritage Foundation's Project Advisory panel.

Institute. Furthermore, Mr. Thomas Bell, President of the Hudson Institute is also President of the Center for Naval Analysis.⁷¹

- The movement is not without linkages to defense contractors. Both John Boyd and Pierre Sprey have long advocated movement away from the Air Force trend of fighter aircraft of ever increasing weight and cost and decreased maneuverability. General Dynamics' F-16 is offered by most reformers as an aircraft that broke that trend. We were told that one of the reasons the F-16 exists today is because General Dynamics listened to the concepts enunciated principally by Boyd, and also by Sprey. Furthermore, General Dynamics adhered to a design discipline of high performance and low cost throughout the process of building the F-16.⁷²

- Finally, although unable to fully document, our research indicates that whistle-blowers working with PMP are made available to Congressional staffs. This is done when a legislator has an interest in a particular weapon system or component such as during the recent spare parts controversy. We believe this could take place only in those Congressional offices that maintain relatively close relations with PMP.

--Establishment

For the most part, OSD and the Services, operating independently of one another, share little information concerning the reform movement. This is probably indicative of their belief that the reform movement is not a threat. Occasionally, however, reformer accusations generate such national exposure and interest that OSD and the Services are compelled to respond with a single voice.

The recent appointment of Maurice N. Shriber as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the newly established Office of Spares Program Management is just such an example. This office was created to coordinate Service efforts in identifying and solving spare parts abuses. As mentioned earlier, Shriber has opened a dialogue with the Project on Military Procurement. The identification of this overt linkage between OSD and reformer organizations is unique in our research.

OSD appears to make use of industry associations (e.g. EIA, NSIA) and defense lobbyists to diffuse the consensus building around reform proposals. Faced with calls for legislation dealing with quality control in defense products, an OSD official addressed a group of industry representatives and asked them to use their offices to stymie Congressional efforts. When we asked an industry representative if this was normal practice, he replied, "yes," adding, "when the customer speaks, we listen."⁷³

Government officials working defense issues rarely remain in the same job for an extended period. John Collins, a noted defense analyst, states the average tenure for a Secretary of Defense is less than two-and-one-half years.⁷⁴

At a lower level, two examples illustrate this point. Michael B. Donley, former Professional Staff Member to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) recently became the National Security Council's Director of Defense Programs. In this position he is responsible for coordinating the Administration's stance on JCS Reform and DoD Reorganization--an issue he worked extensively while associated with the SASC.

Chapman B. Cox, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, is currently OSD General Counsel. In this position he heads a newly created group charged with devising a DoD strategy concerning JCS Reform and DoD Reorganization--an issue that the Navy has historically resisted.

Furthermore, Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), an active member of the CSIS Defense Organization Project, recently became Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. As Chairman, he occupies a position that allows him to set the committee agenda. Consequently, he is now better able to enhance the possible enactment of specific CSIS proposals. Aspin has already indicated that he will hold a series of four hearings on DoD Reorganization.⁷⁵

The most visible high-ranking official within DoD actively involved with refuting or checking reformer proposals is Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. Throughout his tenure as Service Secretary, Lehman has taken an active role in bringing procurement reform to the Navy. He is credited by many with increasing dual sourcing of critical spares and putting significant pressure on contractors to bring down the cost of Navy systems.⁷⁶ His current concern, however, is centered upon JCS reform and DoD reorganization. Three examples illustrate Lehman's activities.

1. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative organization, sponsored a study on JCS reform. The conclusions closely paralleled the recommendations made by the CSIS Defense Organization Project and called for increasing the authority of the Chairman, JCS, at the expense of the military departments. Lehman, in the spring of 1984, used his influence with Edwin Feulner, the President of the Heritage Foundation (a close friend and former college

roommate) to prevent publication of the report.⁷⁷ Heritage did, however, advocate a similiar view later in the year when they published Mandate for Leadership II.⁷⁸

2. During the debate over JCS reform in the 98th Congress, Senator John Tower, then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), instructed his staff to conduct an extensive study on JCS and DoD reorganization. When the preliminary results of the study (based on SASC hearings and staff research) recommended an even more comprehensive reorganization than that being proposed in the House, the study was terminated.⁷⁹ Many sources allege that Secretary Lehman used his influence with SASC Staff Director and Chief Counsel, James F. McGovern, to accomplish this.⁸⁰ The recent appointment of James Locher as staff leader of a bipartisan committee to revise the SASC report seems to confirm this contention. Specifically, Locher has been instructed to report directly to both Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) SASC Chairman and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) ranking minority member. It is significant to note that under this framework, the revised SASC report will circumvent the official oversight of Staff Director McGovern.⁸¹

3. When CSIS made public their Defense Organization Project's draft report, Secretary Lehman called the proposals "a very foolish way to organize a democracy's decision-making." He argued that the proposals would centralize too much power in Washington and diminish civilian control.⁸² Furthermore, professional staff members of two separate Congressional committees, as well as an individual who participated in the study, report that Lehman used Navy influence within CSIS in an attempt to force CSIS to disassociate itself from

the Defense Organization Project's final report.

Secretary Lehman's actions seem to confirm the belief held by some that the Navy has the most to lose should reform proposals regarding JCS reform and DoD reorganization materialize. Faced with a growing consensus supporting organizational reform, he appears willing to use his political influence to defeat proposals with which he disagrees.

Chapter IV

Political Effect

In this chapter, we will evaluate the political effect of the military reformers' motivations, interests and strategies as well as the responses they have elicited from the establishment. This will be done by examining three specific case studies. For each case study, we will attempt to characterize the actors' views followed by our own evaluation.

1. Establishment of the Office of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).

Legislation enacted by Congress in July, 1983, established OT&E as an independent office within OSD reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. The legislation was silent regarding any changes to the Office of Developmental Testing within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&E). OT&E is not charged with conducting independent tests. Instead, the office is organized to approve and oversee the test masterplans that the independent test offices of each Service design and implement.

Congress dictated that the office be fully staffed and a civilian director appointed by November 1983.¹ As of this date, only half the staff has been hired and no civilian director appointed. An Air Force one-star general currently serves as interim director and is supported by a staff comprised exclusively of military officers.²

Reformers' View

The establishment of an independent OT&E has long been a centerpiece of reform proposals.³ For reasons previously stated, the MRC found it an attractive reform since it would alter process rather than policy. They were convinced that without independent testing, many systems which did not adequately meet user requirements were allowed to go into full production. This occurred because of the apparent conflict of interest generated when military project managers and developmental testers worked within the same organizational unit, (i.e., USDR&E). This problem was exacerbated when defense contractors were made responsible for much of the testing.

Without valid tests, Congress does not have the documentation necessary to cut through pork barrel considerations and cancel specific weapon systems. The reformers hope that a strong OT&E will provide the Secretary of Defense with the ammunition needed to cancel questionable systems, thus freeing Congress of the burden of addressing such a highly charged political issue.

DoD and Military View

It is not surprising that OSD and the individual Services were not supportive of the establishment of OT&E. Their support would have been an admission that tests (1) had not been conducted or (2) were not being conducted properly. Furthermore, USDR&E, then headed by Dr. Richard D. DeLauer, strongly opposed the legislation on the grounds that USDR&E was already fulfilling OT&E's mission.

OSD argues that OT&E will not necessarily result in better systems being procured. It has become the official DoD position that the establishment of

offices such as OT&E merely add excessive overhead to the Pentagon bureaucracy.⁴

OSD has been forced to respond to public and Congressional criticism that, 16 months after the deadline set by law, a civilian director for OT&E has yet to be appointed. OSD officials state that it is difficult to find a qualified individual willing to leave private industry and take a pay cut as a political appointee.⁵ Marybel Batjer, Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for Executive Personnel, vigorously denies any stonewalling in filling the OT&E Director's billet.*

Journalists and Media View

The media's interest in OT&E grew out of its coverage of assertions of "rigged tests" and subsequent tainted results. OSD's apparent refusal to name a civilian director of OT&E reignited the media's interest. Furthermore, OSD attempted to "reassign" an Air Force colonel (James Burton) calling for live-fire tests on a fully combat loaded Bradley Fighting Vehicle against the strong objections of the Army. The colonel's possible reassignment soon became the subject of a critical lead off editorial in The New York Times.⁷

Researchers' Evaluation

Most would agree that the legislation establishing OT&E is the result of

*Batjer states two significant problems relative to hiring anyone into a "high-tech" executive position: (1) DoD salary of approximately \$70,000 is not commensurate with comparable positions in the civilian sector, and (2) the requirement to divest all defense holdings to satisfy conflict of interest laws.⁶

reform efforts and, more specifically, the Military Reform Caucus.⁸ Even with this victory, however, nothing demonstrates more clearly the difficulty of forcing reform on DoD.

The reformers may be criticized for not calling for the creation of an independent testing office encompassing both developmental and operational testing. Without such an office, OT&E is forced, as interim OT&E director Brigadier General Michael Hall stated, "to jump on a fast moving train,"⁹ since operational testing follows developmental testing. Furthermore, USDR&E can be expected to attempt to maintain its own OT&E functions, duplicating OT&E if necessary, and possibly providing contradictory test results to Congress. Finally, the delay in fulfilling the requirements of the law, regardless of the explanations provided by OSD, are perceived by reformers, the media, and, more important, Congress as an example of DoD "stonewalling." Such perceptions significantly impact on DoD credibility.

2. Weapon System Procurement and Spare Parts.

Neither reformers nor defenders of the status quo are completely satisfied with today's weapon system procurement process. Both sides complain about the extremely long, and often very costly, cycle that begins with a statement of need and culminates with the fielding of a system that possibly meets their requirements. The acquisition of spare parts to support on-line systems has also been the subject of much public debate.

Reformers' View

Those who fancy themselves as reformers believe that an enormous amount of

money is wasted on ineffective, unproven and noncompetitively procured weapon systems and accompanying spares. They see Service "goldplating" as increasing the cost of weapons without adding to their effectiveness, thus lengthening the procurement cycle. Additionally, they are critical of a perceived overreliance on technology as a solution to meet the numerically superior Soviet threat.

Making extensive use of the work of Pentagon analyst Franklin C. Spinney, reformers argue that there has been a deliberate and systematic underbudgeting and underfunding of new systems and their corresponding operation and maintenance accounts.¹⁰ Reformers are convinced that DoD realizes that once they gain initial approval of a major system, Congress will be politically reluctant to deny the additional dollars necessary to field the system. This is a result of the complexity of today's weapons, which frequently have a major contractor with innumerable sub-contractors located in literally hundreds of Congressional districts.¹¹ This problem has multiplied during the most recent Administration because of the additional systems contracted for to complete President Reagan's defense build-up.

There is a growing belief among reformers that operational requirements are sacrificed in the face of political considerations during the resource allocation and contract award process. Recent reports of the inability of the DIVAD Air Defense gun to accomplish its mission came as no surprise to many reformers. They have argued for many years that, as a result of operational tests (OT-1), the DIVAD contract should have been awarded to General Dynamics rather than Ford Aerospace Systems.¹² They base their assertion on a belief that Ford was awarded the contract to preclude them from going ahead with

plans to request a government guaranteed loan,* much the same as that given to Chrysler Corporation.¹³ Finally, the spare parts controversy has served reformer purposes by highlighting the inadequacies of the procurement system in terms the average citizen can understand.

DoD and Military View

As stated earlier, DoD is not content with the present budgeting or procurement system. Some DoD officials discount reformer arguments and point instead to budget inconsistencies that they argue are a result of a self-serving Congress, not DoD misrepresentation.¹⁴ Public and Congressional preoccupation with slowing the growth of defense spending is a direct result of the DoD budget containing, by far, the largest portion of "discretionary spending" in the entire U.S. budget.¹⁵ Consequently, DoD officials see themselves as more easily targetable figures than their colleagues in other governmental agencies.

DoD officials believe that the monopsonistic relationship between the government and defense contractors naturally results in higher costs. Firmly committed to cutting fraud, waste, and abuse from the system, they believe it essential to pay a premium price to ensure that weapons work in combat. General James P. Mullins, Commander of the Air Force Logistics Command,

*Although we were unable to confirm this assertion, there does appear to be some empirical proof that financial conditions at Ford in 1981 (prior to the awarding of the DIVAD contract) may have been severe enough to precipitate a bail-out request. Specifically, in a letter to shareholders on 3 January 1985 (which accompanied a special cash dividend) Ford stated, "The extra dividend provides some degree of compensation for dividend reductions and elimination during the unprecedented 1980 to 1982 downturn."

states: "The \$30 machine screws needed for the F-4 were not run-of-the-mill, galvanized steel fasteners available at the corner hardware store."¹⁶

Defense officials defend their reliance on the use of high technology to offset Soviet and Warsaw Pact numerical superiority on three accounts. First, superior technology is a traditional American strength vis-a-vis the Soviets. Second, manpower considerations preclude the manning of a significantly greater number of systems that would be made possible by converting to a low technology high-quantity mix. Finally, the Soviet Union has integrated high tech systems into its arsenal, forcing the U.S. to answer in kind.

Journalists', Research Foundations' and Contractors' View

The press has had a heyday with \$7,600 coffee pots for C-5 cargo planes and \$1,000 plastic stool caps for AWACs aircraft.¹⁷ Their coverage of these stories has heightened public interest and has called into question DoD's stewardship of tax dollars.

Recently, both Georgetown's CSIS and The Heritage Foundation have printed studies that, in part, call for reform of the procurement system. CSIS' study was originally designed to analyze JCS reform; however, it has been expanded to include weapons procurement. With the addition of procurement issues to the foundations' agenda, DoD finds itself facing calls for procurement reform from yet another front. The CSIS study embraces some of the same criticisms first offered by Spinney in both his "Defense Facts of Life" as well as his most recent Congressional testimony.¹⁸

No contractor is willing to defend apparent spare parts abuses, least of all General Dynamics and their \$9,609.00 allen wrench (costing 0.12¢ in a

hardware store). There is a belief among contractors, however, that DoD contract-pricing policies are partially responsible for many of the reported overcharges.*

Although one would think that the defense industry would see goldplating as a way to increase profits, instead they consider it a problem for two reasons. First, it represents a threat to their ability to remain on schedule during both the developmental and production stages. Second, it could have an adverse affect on weapon system performance because it negatively affects design discipline. Regarding goldplating, one industry official remarked that Air Force generals are a lot like Mother Nature: "Where Mother Nature abhors imbalance on earth, Air Force generals abhor empty spaces in cockpits."²⁰

Industry officials claim to support increased competition, so long as the competition is legitimate and is not designed solely to substantiate the award of a contract to a preselected participant. The industry is also willing to provide warranties, but will not do so for free. Consequently, in an effort to drive down the price of systems, mandatory warranties may in fact raise the total cost. The industry is concerned that any reform enacted by Congress relative to warranties allows DoD the flexibility to determine when they are in the best interest of the taxpayer.

*Defense industry officials state that procurement regulations allow companies to charge the government for the capital costs associated with the manufacture of many weapon systems, parts and spares. Accepted accounting practices permit capital charges to be divided evenly among the individual components. For example, if one weapon system consisting of 10 parts requires \$100 in capital to manufacture, \$10 will be added to the price of each component, regardless of the value of the component. Therefore, if the most expensive component costs \$60 to manufacture, the price to the government will be \$70. If the least expensive component is manufactured for \$1, the government will be charged \$11.¹⁹

Researchers' Evaluation

PMP's role, in bringing to the public's attention the many examples of spare parts' overpricing, has lent credibility to the longstanding reform criticism of procurement system inadequacies. It is important to note, however, that the vast majority of examples of spare parts overpricing were identified by DoD employees in the performance of their daily duties. For instance, of the 92 examples offered by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities as abuses,²¹ 78 were DoD-identified. In the overwhelming majority of those cases, DoD did not pay the contractor or was given a refund.²²

It is important to note that examples of so-called "spare parts abuses" are drawn from hundreds of thousands of parts and tool orders each year. There are problems in defense procurement, but not necessarily of the nature or extent suggested by the attention given this issue.

DoD has been remiss, however, in not taking the initiative in being the first to release information of spare parts overpricing. By allowing others this opportunity, DoD now finds itself in a similar position regarding the spare parts controversy as it does regarding OT&E. Specifically, the general public has now been added to those groups (reformers, media, Congress) who perceive DoD as being negligent in its responsibilities.

The real impact of the spare parts controversy has been to draw attention to the entire procurement process. To date, however, DoD's response appears to be primarily reactive. Public-relations campaigns are needed, but should be conducted to set the agenda, not used solely to respond to reformer charges.

Maurice Shriber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Spares Program Management, is attempting to put his office in the position to set the agenda by opening a dialogue with reform organizations. Of all the OSD officials we interviewed, Shriber appears the most willing to reverse the perception that DoD strategy is one of defensive reaction marked by stonewalling tactics.

The establishment of an OSD office for spare parts management could have been more effective in diffusing reformer criticism had it been established earlier in the controversy. There also needs to be a legitimate effort to complement OSD public relations solutions with functional reforms. Past failures to work on functional fixes has resulted in a loss of credibility.

We were surprised that in more than 70 interviews conducted there was very little criticism of Spinney's work. Although many in DoD agree with his findings, they criticize him (we believe unjustly) for the way his analysis gained public exposure. Additionally, they consistently state that Spinney's work was historical in nature and addressed the problems of previous Administrations. They continue by arguing that the "Carlucci Reforms" implemented in 1981 have, for the most part, resolved these problems.*

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci believes, however, that his 32 initiatives have partly failed because program stability has been undermined by Congressional action. He states, "I pity whoever is going to be

*The Defense Acquisition Improvement Program, also known as the "Carlucci Reforms" were drafted by a DoD Task Force in 1981. The 32 initiatives were designed to begin a long-term reform of the acquisition process. They addressed such items as realistic budgeting for inflation, expanded use of independent cost estimating, and efforts to enhance competition and dual-source production.

Secretary of Defense in the next two to three years because he will have to answer the charges of the next Spinney."²³

While discussing spare parts abuses one Congressional staffer remarked, "most Congressmen want to take credit for exposing the problem, but every Congressman wants to be the one to solve it."²⁴ This has undoubtedly been one of the reasons for the previously mentioned increase in the number of Congressional committees looking at procurement and the tendency to move from oversight to regulation.²⁵

It would appear unless DoD can establish that the action it has taken will remedy the problem, it will be faced with defending itself in front of innumerable committees, subcommittees, and special panels. Further revelations in this arena will probably lead to continued erosion of the consensus supporting adequate defense spending.

3. JCS Reform and DoD Reorganization.

Since its creation in 1947, there have been continuing calls to reform the JCS system. Some proposals have been written into law (e.g., the 1958 Amendment--which established regional commanders and detailed their chain of command). Other proposals have served only as interesting topics for cocktail conversation. Current calls for JCS reform generally include such proposals as: (1) strengthening the role of the Chairman; (2) increasing the size of the Joint Staff; (3) limiting Service staff involvement in the joint process; (4) reducing the size of the military department staffs; and (5) making the Chairman a voting member of the National Security Council. This list is not all-inclusive, but provides a sample of the types of changes being proposed.

Historically, the Navy has been the most vigorous and consistent opponent of JCS reform. In a recent article in Navy News and Undersea Technology, "Lehman's War: Secretary Battles Plan to Submerge Navy Role," the authors outline the Navy's traditional opposition to any proposal which may ultimately curb Naval autonomy. They quote a leading proponent of the CSIS proposals as stating "Ship captains are given great authority and more independence than their counterparts in the Army or the Air Force."²⁶ The article goes on to state:

John Kester, former special assistant to then-Defense Secretary Harold Brown, said the independence is borne from the naval service's considerable resources. Because the Navy maintains its own air force in its air wing, its own army in the Marines and its own ability to project its forces, Kester notes, it is easy to see why the service resists integration. "It's pretty self-sufficient, especially compared to the Army," he said. "There are certain habits of independence that the Navy's mission creates."²⁷

Most recently, the House of Representatives took the lead in addressing JCS reform with passage of the Nichols Bill.²⁸ In the 98th Congress, the Senate did not pass its own bill. Conferees, however, unable to agree on comprehensive legislation, made "minor" changes to the current organization. In their final report, they agreed that JCS reform would be high on the agenda of the 99th Congress; furthermore, they stated that it is only part of a much larger problem they identify as DoD reorganization.

Reformers' View

Military officers generally receptive of reform proposals have long argued that JCS reform is the key to meaningful defense reform. Some reformers, both civilian and military, have considered these contentions merely a smoke-screen

to call attention away from needed functional reforms (e.g. doctrine, procurement, and force structure).

Recently, civilian reformers have become more receptive to the idea that meaningful JCS Reform that is part of DoD reorganization may be instrumental in implementing many of the functional reforms they advocate. One of the reasons for this may be the inclusion of functional reforms to studies originally envisioned to address only JCS reform.²⁹

DoD and Military View

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger recently stated that he would not support changes in the operation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁰ The current debate on JCS reform, however, originated with then-Chairman of the JCS General David C. Jones. Just prior to retirement, Jones called for "a stronger role and better support" for the Chairman so that parochial interests of the individual military Services do not overwhelm, as they sometimes do, a broader view of what is best for overall defense.³¹

There undoubtedly remain high-ranking civilian and military leaders within DoD who personally support JCS reform. Their numbers have decreased over the last two years, however, primarily because of the current Chairman's personal style of leadership. They believe General John W. Vessey, Jr.'s collegial approach has resulted in a reduction of Service parochialism.³² A common comment of several leaders who have spent more than one tour in the Pentagon is that they have never seen the JCS run more smoothly or be more effective--a direct result of General Vessey's personal leadership.³³ It appears that the personalities and leadership styles of the current Service chiefs complement, rather than conflict with, General Vessey's persona.

Consequently, they believe the current system is working adequately and see no need for change.

These leaders accept the traditional view that the Chairman's role is to articulate the JCS position or policy on a particular matter, not to establish it. They are extremely critical of those who claim that the current JCS system supports force structure increases at the expense of real warfighting capability.

Journalists', Research Foundations' and Contractors' View

Outside the Pentagon, foundations have taken the lead in shaping the debate concerning JCS reform. By including the other areas of functional reform in their proposals for reorganization, the foundations seem to have raised public awareness of the issue.*

It is only recently that such issues have drawn broad attention from the media. Since there has been no sizeable constituency for JCS reform, journalists had been reluctant to devote much effort to its analysis.

The defense industry has not joined in this aspect of the reform debate.** They see it as a non-starter, believing--as does DoD--that real

*A good example is the series of Backgrounders published by The Heritage Foundation in support of their Defense Assessment Project. Specific examples relate to procurement (C. Lincoln Hoewing, "Improving the Way the Pentagon Acquires its Weapons", 28 November 1984), budgeting (Anonymous, "The Advantages of Two-year Budgeting for the Pentagon", 5 November 1984), and military compensation (Lieutenant General Richard L. West, USA (Retired), "Military Compensation: A Key Factor in America's Defense Readiness", 18 October 1984).

**Theodore J. Crackel, Director of The Heritage Foundation's Defense Assessment Project counters, however, that their project did enlist the efforts of many people from defense industry, but most preferred to remain anonymous.

reform begins with Congress reforming itself.

Researchers' Evaluation

Following the lead of Congress and the various foundations, civilian reformers have come to see JCS reform as a required subset of DoD reorganization. Besides discussing JCS reform, the CSIS Defense Organization Project and The Heritage Foundation's Defense Assessment Project both addressed (1) defense planning and resource allocation; (2) weapons acquisition; and (3) the Congressional defense-budget process. It seems certain that any future debate on JCS reform will include reform proposals in these functional areas. It remains to be seen if this expanded agenda will facilitate meaningful reform or merely make a tough problem even tougher.

Within DoD, JCS reform seems to have fallen out of vogue because of the enormous popularity of General Vessey engendered by his personality and leadership style. No doubt, he has been an effective chairman. His stewardship, however, has been spared many of the hard choices that have confronted other Chairmen during times of decreasing defense budgets. It is important to point out that General Vessey has served continuously on active duty since World War II. The other members of the Joint Chiefs joined their respective Services after World War II.* This fact alone makes the current Chairman, if not by law at least in the minds of the four Service Chiefs, the

*General Vessey enlisted in the Minnesota National Guard in May 1939, was called to active duty in February 1941 and received a battlefied commission on 6 May 1944. Admiral Watkins, CNO, was commissioned in June 1949 and the remaining Chiefs, General Gabriel, CSAF; General Kelly, CMC; and General Wickham, CSA were all commissioned in June 1950.

senior military leader in the United States. Undoubtedly, this nuance complements General Vessey's popular leadership style.

Additionally, some thought must be given to the possibility that a Chairman with lesser leadership talents might someday chair the JCS during a period marked by a significant lack of Congressional and public support for defense.

The recent establishment of an office within OJCS to independently analyze Service budget proposals (Strategic Plans and Resource Analysis Agency (SPRAA)) may precipitate the enactment of some very real JCS reform.* Although not in its charter, if SPRAA is able to provide future Chairmen an independent evaluation of Service requirements, it may go a long way towards minimizing the perceived disconnect between warfighting capability and force-structure increases.

Secretary Lehman has established a reputation as a leading critic of JCS reform. Thus he has reaffirmed the historic Navy position of opposing legislation that would lessen Service autonomy. The intensity that he has brought to the debate is reflected not only in his public statements, but in the private actions he has taken to squelch reform initiatives. Secretary Lehman has shown a willingness to play old-fashioned power politics over this issue and, to date, many would argue that he has been quite effective.

There are indications that those believing reform is necessary are aware

*Established in 1984, SPRAA assists the JCS in fulfilling their statutory responsibilities to review the major materiel and personnel requirements of the Armed Forces. Additionally, SPRAA provides analyses and recommendations concerning the impact of DoD program and budget proposals upon the warfighting capability of the Armed Forces.³⁴

of Secretary Lehman's actions and are prepared to match him in kind. In a recent letter to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, Senators Goldwater and Nunn stated that they would continue past SASC efforts to study the "organization and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defense."³⁵ They announced the formation of a task force to "complete the [SASC] Committee's bipartisan study efforts and to draft any necessary legislation."³⁶ They went on to say:

We have not yet taken a position on any of the issues that the Committee has studied. This does not appear to be the case with certain vocal elements of the Department of Defense. In general, we are troubled by the negative public stance that the Department of Defense has taken on various organizational proposals that are beginning to surface in the defense academic community. These premature reactions are likely to complicate efforts by the Congress and Executive Branch to develop a cooperative approach on this subject. In addition, we are disturbed by reports that some private officials of the Department of Defense are working behind the scenes to discredit the work of private organizations that are studying these important topics.³⁷

Copies of this "Dear Cap" letter were sent to Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and The Honorable Robert C. McFarland, Director of the National Security Council.

As mentioned earlier, the task force director appointed by Senators Goldwater and Nunn, James Locher, reports directly to them. Thus, Locher by-passes the Committee Staff Director, James McGovern, an associate of Secretary Lehman. Locher stated this was "a very unusual arrangement for the Senate Armed Services Committee."³⁸

A consensus appears to be building in favor of seriously addressing JCS reform and DoD reorganization. It is too early to tell whether Secretary Lehman's past willingness to use his political power and connections to stifle

the debate over JCS reform may have backfired. It does appear, however, that DoD as a whole, and Secretary Lehman in particular, should consider reversing the perception that they are unwilling to enter into a constructive debate concerning DoD organization. Failure to reverse this perception may provoke Congress to design and implement legislation that could run counter to the best interests of DoD.

CHAPTER V

Conclusions and Recommendations

The establishment of OT&E, the ongoing spare parts controversy, and the growing constituency arguing for DoD reorganization indicate that political forces are coalescing that will most likely result in a more unified and politically powerful reform movement. It is significant that the reformers have gained strength during a period of overwhelming public support for a strong defense and increased defense spending.

We are not alone in reaching these conclusions. Panel members serving on Georgetown's CSIS Defense Organization Project are convinced that the political balance has shifted in favor of reform.¹ The results of their study, they claim, "will be offered to a public that has become disenchanted with the cost of the military and to a Congress in which some senior positions have been taken over by self-described reformers."² It is interesting to note that CSIS is not a traditional hotbed of reform, nor can a majority of the panel members be counted among the ranks of avowed military reformers.

In the mid and late seventies, when only individuals could be identified with military reform, DoD did not need a strategy because the reform movement did not exist. Although there were reformers demanding change, their political power base was non-existent. On the rare occasion when support grew for a specific reform proposal, the defense establishment could stonewall and, if required, turn for help to friends in Congress.

Today it appears that a broad power base favoring reform has evolved. Numerous factors outlined in this paper account for this. Some of the most important facts, however, have little to do with reform proposals. First, institutional changes in Congress have collectively weakened the seniority system, challenged the credibility of once powerful committees, and promoted legislative oversight. Second, the public appears more concerned (and some would argue more knowledgeable) about a variety of defense issues. And finally, the defense budget has become the largest and most convenient target for those wanting to reduce record budget deficits.

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, (prior to the formal establishment of OT&E) Admiral James D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, stated:

The proposed DoD Test and Evaluation Agency is a prime example of yet another layer of bureaucracy. Rather than holding accountable those who now have responsibility for Test and Evaluation functions, we are about to unnecessarily reorganize.³

The subsequent establishment of OT&E, forced on DoD by Congress, may become only the first of many Congressionally mandated reform changes to the way DoD conducts business. Admiral Watkins' concern may multiply manyfold unless DoD takes steps to ensure it is a participant in future reform debates.

Regardless of the acceptability of reformer tactics, reformers have succeeded in focusing public attention on the fishbowl in which DoD management must take place. This phenomenon is likely to continue. Consequently, DoD needs to join the public debate; armed with a strategy that will reverse the perception that it is stonewalling. To do otherwise is a self-defeating strategy since a defensive approach will not work as the debate widens and increases in intensity.

The first element in any strategy designed to establish DoD as a credible player in the debate must be the creation of an independent mechanism to evaluate reform proposals. Such a capability will provide policy makers the information necessary to look beyond the sometimes abrasive personalities of those advocating reform, thus allowing DoD to focus on the relative merits of specific reform proposals. This is in contrast with the current practice in which reform proposals are evaluated by organizations with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. This capability will also give DoD the opportunity to develop an informed and credible position concerning reform issues. Furthermore, DoD will then be able to set the reform agenda ensuring that reform criticisms (e.g. spare parts overpricing) are placed in the proper perspective.

If the full benefit of independent analysis is to be realized, an individual must be designated with the responsibility of coordinating DoD's efforts concerning reform. That individual must be the final arbitrator of the DoD position before it is presented to the Secretary of Defense for approval. In this role, he or she must be able to cut through Service and bureaucratic parochialism that supports consensus building decision-making rather than the acceptance of positions clearly in the best interests of national defense.

Whoever is responsible for coordinating DoD's reform strategy must keep open lines of communication with career bureaucrats and military officers who offer alternative solutions to DoD management problems. If DoD continues to be perceived as non-responsive by such individuals, they will continue to use non-DoD agencies in order to voice their proposals. A mechanism to allow their views to surface must be developed otherwise DoD will forfeit the

opportunity to possibly "reform" itself. Subsequently, the Congress or the public may force reforms on DoD.

DoD must understand the impact of the changing dynamics of Congress brought about by subtle rules changes and limited structural reform. The Military Reform Caucus is but a symptom of these changes. No longer can DoD rely upon a few powerful "friends" in Congress to ensure legislative approval of its programs. The full impact of these changes has been masked by significant Congressional and public support for increased defense expenditures. History has shown that military build-ups are followed by periods of decreasing support for defense expenditures. DoD must ensure that it fully understands the Congressional climate that will influence the next stage of the debate.

Finally, DoD should improve its effectiveness and image by developing the capability and willingness to affix responsibility when mistakes are made. A common perception held by many citizens is that DoD is reluctant to punish or even discuss the actions of senior officials who are perceived to have been derelict in carrying out their duties.

In order for DoD to maintain its position as the primary architect of defense policy in the United States, it is paramount that it view the reform movement with more interest and concern than it has previously exhibited. Calls for reform should be encouraged because they are the natural by-product of a democracy. When democratic leaders perceive well intentioned reformers as self-serving critics, their policies become defensive and reactive. When this occurs, potential friends become enemies and the opposition is permitted to dictate the direction of the debate. Although not all inclusive, the above recommendations could form the centerpiece of a new strategy that could reverse this perception and guarantee continued DoD leadership in the defense arena.

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